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I. INTRODUCTION

The Uniform Mediation Act ("UMA") has gone to the states for consideration
after about five years of research, drafting, and vetting, and ultimately,
overwhelming support by the American Bar Association ("ABA"),2 the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), 3 most major
4
dispute resolution professional organizations
and service providers, 5 and many if
6
scholars.
not most leading dispute
Despite this support, concerns about the UMA still continue to echo from its
drafting.

This is hardly surprising, given the daunting nature of the task.

In

addition to joining with law a field that has long prided itself as apart from the
system, the Drafters seriously, and often courageously, engaged the complex and
often competing interests that surround issues of mediation and its cardinal value
of confidentiality. The array of viewpoints about mediation, complicated by
different professional, practice, and scholarly orientations toward mediation, was
reflected in a robust drafting process that was generally collegial but sometimes
difficult, as fair-minded people of goodwill with deeply held opinions "worked the
issues" with passion and conviction. 7 Moreover, newcomers entering the UMA

dialogue generally had to begin from scratch, raising perfectly legitimate
questions that already had been discussed at length. As those who participated in
the drafting process know well, these debates often looked more contentious from
outside the room, as some observers attempted to influence the drafting by

2. The UMA was endorsed by the ABA House of Delegates on Feb. 4, 2002, and was co-sponsored
by fourteen ABA sections or other entities: the Section of Dispute Resolution, Section of Business
Law, Tort and Insurance Practice Section, Section of Labor and Employment Law, Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, Family Law Section, ABA Commission on Mental and
Physical Disability, Air and Space Law Forum, Real Property Probate and Trust Section, Senior
Lawyers Division, Section of Family Law, Judicial Administration Division, State and Local
Government Section, and the Government and Public Sector Lawyers Division.
More than a half dozen other ABA entities either supported (but did not co-sponsor) or were neutral on
the UMA, including: the Section of Litigation, Section Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Section
of International Law and Practice, Criminal Law Section, Antitrust Law Section, Health Law Section,
and Young Lawyers Division.
3. The UMA was approved for consideration by the states on Aug. 17, 2001.
4. These principally include: the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, the Association of Family
and Dependency Courts, The Ombudsman Association, the Association for Conflict Resolution
(qualifed by conditioning endorsement on individual state treatment of certain choices left to states by
the Act).
5. These principally include: the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), Judicial Arbitration
and Mediation Service ("JAMS"), and CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution.
6. But see Scott Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To The Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85 Marq.
L. Rev. 9 (2001) (generally arguing against the UMA's mediation privilege); Joseph B. Stulberg, The
UMA: Some Roads Not Taken (in this volume).
7. See e.g. Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving
Conflict 244-66 (2d ed., Jossey-Bass 1996).
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swaying public opinion within the mediation community toward certain
positions. 8
Yet, at the end of the day, the Act was, for the most part, able to draw the
support of even its most ardent critics, precisely because the issues had been
engaged deeply, sincerely, respectfully, and with an eye toward a constructive
future. 9 While the participants recognized that unanimity would be unlikely, they
also understood they could achieve a sensible, sensitive balance that would be
enactable as state legislation because it was acceptable to litigators as well as
mediators, to academics as well as practitioners, to non-lawyer mediators as well
as lawyer mediators, to employers as well as employees, to prosecutors as well as
the defense bar, and on and on. In other words, while the final UMA may not have
been what most participants might have drafted personally, it was something that
nearly all participants could support as a substantial improvement upon the status
quo for most states - a net gain for the mediation process, and a monument to the
field's ability to "walk the talk."1 °
Continuing UMA "concerns," therefore, have a certain vestigial or residual
character, often reflecting views taken in battles that were fought within the
drafting sessions - sometimes fiercely - but which were incapable of producing a
majority among the UMA drafters. Professor Brian Shannon's criticisms largely
echo these discussions, and in this Article I seek to respond to some of them after first extending my greatest appreciation to Professor Shannon for his
willingness to be the "skunk in the parlor" of this symposium edition by generally
aggregating those criticisms." In Part I, I give some of the unpublished history of
the UMA effort in the hope that it may facilitate greater understanding of the
drafting process. In Part II, I categorize Professor Shannon's criticisms into three
distinct (but sometimes overlapping) classes - general criticisms of the Act,
criticisms of specific provisions in the Act, and criticisms of what is not in the Act
- and I respond to those criticisms. Finally, in Part III, I provide some suggestions
to state legislators for integrating the UMA into their laws with minimal
disruption.

II. THE CREATION OF THE UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT
A. An UnprecedentedCollaboration
The birth of the UMA was the result of a confluence of a number of different
forces, not the least of which was the gathering of truly remarkable individuals. Of
the many whose work was vital to the drafting and endorsement of the UMA, two

8. See e.g. Letter from Ron Kelly, Official Observer to the UMA Drafting Committees, to Gene
Lebrun, president of NCCUSL, et al. (May 8, 1999) (copy on file with author); Letter from Ron Kelly
to Commissioners, NCCUSL, et al. (July 27, 1999) (copy on file with author).
9. See e.g. Letter from Ron Kelly to NCCUSL, Most Vocal Critic Now in Support of the Uniform
Mediation Act (Aug. 4, 2001) (on file with author).
10. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Mediation For Mediators? If You Talk the Talk, You'd Better Walk the
Walk: An Examination of How Dispute Resolvers Resolve Disputes, 11 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 403,
405 (1996).
11. See Brian D. Shannon, Dancing with the One that "Brung Us" - Why the Texas ADR
Community has Declined to Embrace the UMA [hereinafter Shannon, Dancing] (in this volume).
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in particular stand out: now-Dean Nancy Rogers of The Ohio State University,
Michael E. Moritz College of Law and The Hon. Michael B. Getty, chair of the
NCCUSL Drafting Committee.
Dean Rogers, one of the founders of the modem mediation movement, saw
the need for a sensible and sensitive interface between law and mediation,
believed in the capacity of a collaboratively drafted model or uniform law to
provide a vehicle for its creation,1 2 and worked tirelessly to achieve it. Judge
Getty, a former legislator and highly respected Life member of the esteemed
NCCUSL, almost single-handedly introduced NCCUSL to the mediation process,
and to the importance of the law's protection of the confidentiality of the
mediation process.
Ironically, they began working their way toward what would become the
UMA while fully unaware of the efforts of the other. On the ABA side,' 3 Rogers
developed a collaborative partnership between the ABA Section of Dispute
Resolution and an academic consortium that included three law schools' 4 - Ohio
State University, University of Missouri-Columbia, and Harvard - that would
bring together many of the nation's leading mediation scholars and practitioners
"to study the effects of law on mediation and negotiation, and to reach a
consensus on a model mediation statute."' 5 Former ABA President Roberta
Cooper Ramo and Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer agreed to
co-chair the initiative,
and The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation agreed to
6
provide funding.'
At roughly the same time, however, Getty succeeded in convincing NCCUSL7
to expand its work on dispute resolution to include mediation confidentiality.1
Recognizing the need to act quickly, NCCUSL appointed a Drafting Committee
on Mediation in the winter of 1997, and set an aggressive schedule for the
promulgation of a statute.' 8
The two organizations soon realized that they were working on similar goals,
and in 1998 took what for them was the historic step of joining forces. During the
12. See Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Mediation: Law, Policy & Practice § 13:03 (2d ed.
1994) (proposing a uniform mediation statute).
13. Often seen as the public face of the legal profession, the ABA has been responsible for authoring
or co-authoring many of the country's most influential model laws, including the Model Penal Code,
the Model Codes of Judicial and Professional Conduct, and the Model Code of Evidence.
14. Two other non-law institutions were part of the consortium: Bowdoin University (represented by
Professor Craig McEwen), and The Ohio State University School of Nursing (represented by Professor
Jeanne Clement).
15. See The Center for the Study of Law and Mediation, Report of Progress and Request for
Supplemental Funding 3 (Oct. 1, 1999) (copy on file with author).
16. See Michael B. Getty, Thomas J. Moyer & Roberta Cooper Ramo, Preface to Symposium on
Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act, 13 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res.787,788 (1998).
17. NCCUSL was already in the process of revising its Uniform Arbitration Act. See Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act (2000). See also John M. McCabe, Uniformity in ADR: UMA, revised UAA
present different challenges, 9 Dis. Res. Mag. 20 (Summer 2002).
18. The work of the NCCUSL Drafting Committee was expected to be completed within two years.
In addition to Getty, its members were: Phillip Carroll, Little Rock, Ark.; Joan Zeldon, Washington,
D.C. (replacing David Dunbar, Jackson, Miss.); Elizabeth Kent, Honolulu, Haw. (replacing Richard
Gregerson, Sioux Falls, S.D.); Byron Sher, Sacramento, Cal.; and Martha Walters, Eugene, Or.
Stanley M. Fisher, Arter & Hadden, Cleveland, Ohio, served ex officio as division chair. Dean Rogers
served as its Reporter, assisted by myself as Associate Reporter, and in the later stages, by nowProfessor Emily Haynes as Reporter Coordinator.
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last century, the Conference has been the primary vehicle through which
uniformity among the states has been achieved in a number of critical areas,
including the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Adoption Act, and the
Uniform Arbitration Act (which has been adopted by approximately two-thirds of
all states). While the two organizations had worked together toward the common
goal of improving the law for nearly a century, they never before had participated
jointly in the actual drafting of proposed legislation for state consideration. 9 Yet
collaboration on the UMA made particular sense given the interests of both
organizations in effective, enactable legislation. Each organization had unique
strengths and capacities, and, indeed, the early research for the initiative clearly
demonstrated that proposed uniform or model legislation is most likely to be
enacted by the states when it is jointly endorsed by the ABA and NCCUSL. 20 This
reflects an important lesson of dispute system design: that participation in the
drafting is more likely to lead to support for the final product.21
The leadership of both organizations agreed to share resources, meet together,
and work collaboratively but independently in the drafting of the Act. The final
structure included separate ABA and NCCUSL drafting committees, 2 with
24
23
interlocking members, that would be supported by a shared team of Reporters
and an Academic Advisory Faculty. 25 Under the agreement, the Academic
Advisory Faculty - chaired by ABA Drafting Committee co-chairs Roberta
Cooper Ramo and Justice Thomas Moyer - would propose the first draft of a
mediation act, continue to provide substantive research support for the drafting
19. See Getty et al, supra n. 16, at 787.
20. See generally, James J. Brudney, Mediation and Some Lessons from the Uniform State Law
Experience, 13 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 795 (1998). Enactment rates of "uniform" legislation tend to
be higher than those of "model" legislation. Id. at 805-13. This is in part because commissioners in
the Conference are said to have a moral obligation to use their best efforts to get proposals for uniform
legislation passed in their states once they have been approved by the full Conference. However,
commissioners have no such moral obligation to advance legislation designated as model by the
Conference, although they are certainly welcome to put forth such efforts on an individual basis. See
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Statement of Policy Establishing
Criteria and Procedures for Designation and Consideration of Acts § 7 (Aug, 2, 1988) (copy on file
with author).
21. William L. Ury, Jeanne M. Brett & Stephen B. Goldberg, Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing
Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict 68-72 (Jossey-Bass 1988). This is the central principle behind the
"reg neg" approach to regulatory rulemaking. See generally Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations:
A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1 (1982).
22. The ABA Drafting Committee was co-chaired by the Hon. Thomas J. Moyer, Chief Justice of
the Ohio Supreme Court, and the Hon. Roberta Cooper Ramo, past president of the ABA. Its members
were: James Diggs, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, PPG Industries, Pittsburg, Pa.; Jose
Feliciano, Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, Ohio; Frank E.A. Sander, Bussey Professor and Associate
Dean, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.; Judith Saul, Executive Director, Community Dispute
Resolution, Ithaca, N.Y.; and the Hon. Annice Wagner, Chief Judge, District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, Washington, D.C. It was coordinated by Dean Rogers, and I served as the Committee's
Reporter.
23. Harvard Law Professor Frank E. A. Sander, Cleveland attorney Jose Feliciano, and Judge Getty.
24. Dean Rogers and myself.
25. These included Professors Frank E.A. Sander (Harvard Law School); Chris Guthrie, John Lande,
James Levin, Leonard L. Riskin, Jean R. Stemlight, and myself (University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law); James Brudney, Sarah R. Cole, L. Camille H6bert, Nancy H. Rogers, Joseph B.
Stulberg, Laura Williams, and Charles Wilson (Ohio State University College of Law); Jeanne
Clement (Ohio State University College of Nursing); and Craig A. McEwen (Bowdoin College). See
Unif. Mediation Act, Prefatory Note, Point 5 (2001).
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committees, and meet periodically to review the evolving draft and advise the two
drafting committees.26 Judge Getty of NCCUSL would chair the joint drafting
sessions, which would be conducted according to NCCUSL requirements. Finally,
the agreement called for the legislation to be submitted for approval by both
organizations.
B. IntegratedIndependence
The independence of the drafting committees was important to both
organizations for at least three sometimes interrelated reasons: the differing scopes
of their respective mandates, the contrasting expectations and requirements for the
composition of their Drafting Committees, and the sometimes conflicting
traditions and processes of the two organizations.
First, the mandates of the ABA and NCCUSL Drafting Committees were not
entirely consistent. For example, the ABA's mission was defined broadly to allow
for the greatest flexibility of researchers and drafters in terms of the issues to be
addressed. The express authorization of the NCCUSL Drafting Committee was
much narrower, however, focusing on confidentiality in mediation, although it
was also permitted
to consider process integrity issues, such as ethics and
27
qualifications.
Second, the expectations of and the requirements for the composition of the
Drafting Committees differed substantially between NCCUSL and the ABA
Drafting Committees. The ABA envisioned a broad-based drafting committee one would that would, for example, include non-lawyers and community
mediators, to reflect the diversity of practices and applications in the mediation
field. By virtue of its governing charter, however, the NCCUSL Drafting
Committee could only be drawn from the membership of the Conference, all of
whom must be lawyers to qualify for appointment as a Commissioner, generally
by the state's governor or legislative leaders. 28 Indeed, as an accommodation to
the ABA, and in the spirit of collaboration, NCCUSL agreed to deviate from its
standard practices by permitting two members of the ABA Drafting Committee to
serve as voting members of the NCCUSL UMA Drafting Committee, rather than
serving in the traditional role of ABA advisors to NCCUSL Drafting Committee. 29
Finally, the organizational traditions and processes of the two groups were
appreciably different. 30 The NCCUSL drafting process is highly regulated, with
meeting times and places for the Study and Drafting Committees fixed by the
organization's leadership, and various requirements for the conduct of the

26. Much of their initial research was published as a law review symposium issue. See Symposium
on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act, 13 Ohio St. J. Dis. Res. 787 (1998).
27. Further, the NCCUSL Drafting Committee was expressly precluded from considering matters
that would determine the structure of court-related mediation programs. NCCUSL does not generally
draft purely regulatory acts, such as licensing or certification regulations.
28. This reason alone made it impossible for the groups to merge into a single Drafting Committee,
which may have seemed the most intuitive way to consolidate efforts.
29. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Procedural and Drafting
Manual 7 (1997).
30. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U.
Penn L. Rev. 595, at 601-04.
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meetings. 31 Its enactment process is also quite formal, with a clearly prescribed
structure that included a "first reading," and then a "second" (and often final)
reading by the full Conference. 32 The ABA Drafting Committee, on the other
hand, had the authority to operate much more informally, meeting when, where,
and how it chose, and to take a proposal for legislation to the ABA Section of
Dispute Resolution, and then to the ABA House of Delegates, for consideration at
any regularly scheduled meeting.
By respecting the traditions of both organizations, the joint Drafting
Committee structure permitted the initiative to bring together the resources,
capacities, and goodwill that neither organization could match on its own. During
the drafting phase, this was probably felt most significantly in the broad range of
mediation perspectives that both committees were able to generate to inform the
drafting process. This included scores of "Official" and unofficial observers that
33
included a vast array of mediation professional and provider organizations,
34
35
various ABA entities, state and local bar associations, and helpful individuals
too numerous to mention. 36 However, all of these observers, contributors, and
advisors were every bit as much of a part of the drafting process as the drafters
themselves.
These commenters brought to the table understandings drawn from the many
different contexts in which mediation is used - court-related, private, community,
and corporate - and along many different dimensions (employer and employee,
community and commercial, etc.). Similarly, they also enhanced the drafting
with a wide spectrum of views about the goals of mediation,37 and about how
31. For
an
online
version,
see
NCCUSL,
Bylaws
Art.
28
(2002)
<http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=l&tabid=l9>(accessed Mar. 11, 2003);
NCCUSL, Drafting Manual pp. 5-8 <http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pdf/ draftingmanual.pdf>(accessed
Mar. 11, 2003) (copy on file with author).
32. NCCUSL, Procedural and Drafting Manual 8-11 (1997) (copy on file with author).
33. Official Observers are appointed by the president of NCCUSL at the recommendation of the
chair of the relevant drafting committee. See NCCUSL, Procedural and Drafting Manual 6 (1997).
These Official Observers included the Association for Conflict Resolution (formerly the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Academy of Family Mediators and CRE/Net), National Council
of Dispute Resolution Organizations, American Arbitration Association, Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS), CPR Institute for
Dispute Resolution, International Academy of Mediators, National Association for Community
Mediation, and the California Dispute Resolution Council. See Unif. Mediation Act, Prefatory Note
cmt. 5 (2001) <http://www.law.penn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/uma200 .htm>(accessed Mar. 11,2003).
34. Other Official Observers included: the American Bar Association Section of Administrative Law
and Regulatory Practice, American Bar Association Section of Litigation, American Bar Association
Senior Lawyers Division, American Bar Association Section of Torts and Insurance Practice,
American Trial Lawyers Association, Equal Employment Advisory Council, National Association of
District Attorneys, and the Society of Professional Journalists. Id.
35. These several state and local Bar Associations, generally working through their ADR
committees, included: the Alameda County Bar Association, the Beverly Hills Bar Association, the
State Bar of California, the Chicago Bar Association, the Louisiana State Bar Association, the
Minnesota State Bar Association, and the Mississippi Bar. Id.
36. One individual, California mediator Ron Kelly, stands out among others without organizational
affiliation because of his important voice in all aspects of the drafting process. See generally Ron
Kelly, Are You Looking for an Update on the Uniform Mediation Act, Most Current UMA Text, or
Contact Info for Your State's Uniform Law Commissioners?
<http://www.ronkelly.com/RonKellyMedAct.html> (accessed March 11, 2003).
37. The range of goals included efficiency for the parties and the courts, deeper reconciliation of the
conflict, and the betterment of society through the use of less adversarial means of resolving disputes.
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mediation is to be conducted,38 reflecting an openness of process that continues to
be widely recognized.39 In the end, it seems fair to say that the drafters' extended
deliberations included the views, and in many cases the range of views, of most
mediation constituencies on many if not most of the issues presented, most of
which was ultimately drafted into the final UMA or official comments.

C. Culturalcross-currents
These diversity strengths are readily appreciable in hindsight. However, they
auguered a challenging drafting process if success, and at least substantial
consensus, was to be achieved. In some respects, the four-year drafting of the
UMA was an intense national dialogue on the mediation process - the nature of
the process, its goals and values, its practices and experience, and its relationship
to law - on a scale that the field of mediation had never before engaged so
publicly. 4° Indeed, those who were involved more closely with the process drafters, reporters, and observers - worked with a sense of history. Over time, this
dialogue would sometimes take the form of a massive cross-cultural negotiation
(and, on occasion, mediation), with all of the challenges that characterize those
processes - including the management of parties, information, and
communications in a way that fosters trust among the participants. To complicate
matters further, this collaboration cut across at least five major dimensions of
potential cultural friction: between mediators and litigators, between lawyer and
non-lawyer mediators, between academicians and practitioners, between those
seeking to preserve vested state interests and those seeking to promote national
interests, 4' and between the instituted cultures of the ABA and NCCUSL.42

38. These included, for example, strong proponents of both the evaluative and facilitative models of
mediation, as well as supporters and opponents of mandatory mediation.
39. See James 3. Alfini, Mediation's Coming of (Legal) Age, 22 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 153, 154 (2002);
Philip J. Harter, The Uniform Mediation Act: An Essential Framework for Self-Determination, 22 N.
Ill. U. L. Rev. 252, 252-53 (2002); Letter from Dennis Sharp et al., on behalf of Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution to Judge Michael B. Getty et al., Uniform Mediation Act Drafting
Committee I (Oct. 8, 1999) (copy on file with author) ("[W]e believe that through the collaborative
and open process you are conducting we will be able to address these concerns and collectively create
effective and responsible protections of mediation communications.").
40. To be sure, there were national level drafting efforts. See e.g. Center for Dispute Settlement and
the Institute of Judicial Administration, National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs
(1992) <http://www.caadrs.org/studies/nationstd.htm>(accessed Mar. 12, 2003); AAA/ABA/SPIDR
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (1994) <http://www.ilr.comell.edu/alliance/
modelstandards of conduct for m.htm.>(accessed Mar. 12, 2003). However, those drafting efforts
were more closed, and were not expected to lead to legislation that would actually be proposed in the
fifty states. The salience of possible enaction alone generated substantial national interest in the UMA.
See Gregory Firestone, An Analysis of Principled Advocacy in the Development of the Uniform
Mediation Act, 22 N. Il. U. L. Rev. 265, 265-66 (2002).
41. These cross-cultural currents were significant, but cannot be addressed precisely. If we have
learned anything about these cultures, it is that the different constituencies affected by mediation do
not speak with one voice, are not monolithic in terms of their interests, and can coalesce and
disaggregate on an issue-by-issue basis. I therefore proceed in this section to speak in general terms,
explicitly acknowledging that the brush sweeps too far to be fully accurate. Still, any attempt to
understand the UMA drafting process is distortive at best if it does not account for the cultural factors
that were so important in the drafting process.
42. See supra nn. 30-32 and accompanying text.
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Space does not permit a full exploration of all of these dimensions, but it is
essential to note at least the general divide between mediators and litigators.
Many mediators, of course, view mediation as something apart from the law - a
different, if not better, way to resolve conflicts through interest-based discussion
and consensus rather than the adversarial litigation of legal claims before a court
of law. This belief gives rise to a certain mythology among many in the mediation
community: that mediation actually operates apart from, and outside of, the legal
system. By contrast many litigators tend to view mediation with suspicion, as at
best an inconvenience on the road to court, and at worst a serious impediment to
the judicial process. 43 For these litigators, the only right result is an adjudicated
result, one that is the product of zealous and competing advocacy. Theirs is the
44
and certainly had voice within the
mythology of "litigation romanticism,'
45
NCCUSL Drafting Committee.
The Uniform Mediation Act crystalized the tension between these two
46
competing mythologies by bringing them into confrontation again and again.
This was nowhere more true than with the Act's centerpiece, confidentiality,
which directly pit the needs, norms, and expectations of the mediation process
against the needs, norms, and expectations of the legal system's insistence on the
availability of "every person's" evidence in establishing or defending claims at
law.47 In even trying to balance this tension, the UMA's confrontation of these
two mythologies met with a wall of resistance to whatever might be drafted. This
dynamic foreshadowed the likelihood of continued resistance long after the
participants at the table had achieved mutual understanding.48
When combined with other cultural divides, the cross-cultural differences
between the mediators and litigators gave rise to an aura of generalized distrust
that is common in complex multi-party negotiations. 49 From the outset, for
43. See e.g. W. Reece Bader, ADR is fine, but not always welcome as an alternative to battle in
court, 6 Dispute Res. Mag. 21 (Spring 2000).
44. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts
Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1871, 1874-75 (1997).
45. One member of the NCCUSL Drafting Committee, an influential former president of NCCUSL,
Commissioner Phil Carroll, in fact spoke against the Act's adoption when it was considered by the
Conference's Committee of the Whole. See Philip Carroll, Uniform Mediation Act - a Dissent (Aug. 8,
2001) (copy on file with author).
46. My sense is that one operating assumption of the UMA drafters was that this inter-relationship
between law and mediation was inevitable, and that the mediation process was best served if it were
undertaken in a thoughtful way by people experienced with mediation as well as law reform.
47. Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 Ohio. St. J. on Dis. Res. 1, 30
(1986); James J. Restivo, Jr. & Debra A. Mangus, Special Supplement - Confidentiality in Alternative
Dispute Resolution(ADR), 2 Alts. to the High Cost of Litig. 5 (May 1984) (encouraging openness in
public decision-making); see News-Press Publg. Co., Inc. v. Lee County, 570 S.2d 1325 (Fla. Dist.
App. 1990); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., v. Gen. Electric Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied. sub. nom, Cincinnati Post v. Gen. Electric Co., 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
48. It is noteworthy that the ABA Section of Litigation did not oppose the UMA in the ABA House
of Delegates, and, in fact, the Litigation Section of the State Bar of New York carried the UMA to the
Board of Governors, where it was unanimously approved in January 2003.
49. For a discussion of the significance of trust in multi-party negotiations, see Susan L. Carpenter &
W.J.D. Kennedy, Managing Public Disputes 205-16 (Jossey-Bass 1988). For an example of how
significantly the lack of trust can influence a particular public policy negotiation, see Melinda Smith,
The Catron County Citizens Group: A Case Study in Community Collaboration, in The ConsensusBuilding Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement 985 (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah
McKearen, & Jennifer Thomas-Lamar eds., Sage Publications 1999).
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example, there was a skepticism among mediators about the need for a mediation
law at all, much less one that would be uniform across the fifty states. 50 The
mediation community after all is one that operates largely on the basis of
standards and norms, rather than coercive legal rules. Even proposing that
mediation has a relationship with law seemed counter-cultural to some mediators,
and threatened to upset the apple cart.
Even assuming need, some mediators were skeptical of NCCUSL's
competence to draft the legislation - in part because as of the time that the
initiative began, none of the members of the NCCUSL Drafting Committee were
full-time mediators; rather, they were all lawyers or judges.
The mediation
community was a field that has grown accustomed to controlling the process and
establishing its own rules; it did not seem particularly interested in regulation by
outsiders. 52 The presence and composition of the ABA Drafting Committee and
its sponsorship by the Section of Dispute Resolution helped somewhat in this
regard. However, the fact that these reforms came from the legal profession cut
even more deeply for some non-lawyer mediators, as it represented further
evidence of cooperation of the field by the lawyers - thus exposing a deep rift
within the mediation field about who would lead the profession, and how it would
evolve.
Given the complexity of the task as a matter of substantive law and nuanced
mediation practice, given the challenges of a commitment by the organizers to an
open and inclusive drafting effort, it is hardly surprising that the issues that
dominated the discussions by the parties at the table would come to be raised
again by -newcomers to the UMA dialogue as the Act now moves to the states for
individual consideration. As a process in which a statute is drafted centrally, and
then enacted diffusely, the uniform law drafting process is one that inherently
invites such echoes - as well as the deference that the product of an inclusive
national dialogue deserves as it stands on its own merits in the end.
III. CRITICISMS OF THE UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT
Criticisms of the Uniform Mediation Act generally fall into one of three
major categories: Criticisms directed generally at either the concept of the Act or
to the Act as a whole (generalized grievances), criticisms that take issue with
particular provisions in the Act (particular complaints), and those which criticize
the act for what it does not include (complaints of exclusion). In this Section, I
address the most significant of the criticisms that may continue to occasionally
arise as the dust settles on the drafting of the UMA.

50. Letter from Norman Brand, mediator-arbitrator, to NCCUSL (July 13, 1999) ("the draft
addresses no clear problem") (copy on file with author).
51. The chair of the NCCUSL Drafting Committee, Michael Getty, mediated hundreds of cases
while serving as a Chancery Court judge in Cook County, Ill., and retired during the drafting process to
pursue a full-time mediation practice.
52. This perception is consistent with research suggesting that the attributes of group formation
include the establishment of group norms within the group, and ethnocentricity with respect to
outsiders. See Ronald J. Fisher, Intergroup Conflict, in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory
and Practice 166, 168-73 (Morton Deutsch and Peter Coleman eds., 2000).
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A. GeneralizedGrievances
This class of UMA criticisms includes a variety of arguments that are not tied
to specific provisions, but rather are directed to the Act as a whole or to the
concept of the Act. Not surprisingly, these contentions sometimes have an air of
masking underlying philosophical disagreement with the existence of a Uniform
Mediation Act. I focus in particular on three of these objections: that the Act is
too complex, that the title of the Act is misleading, and that the Act will never
become a uniform law (so why bother).

1. The UMA is too complex
Professor Shannon introduces his Article with several pages of hypothetical
mediator discussions of confidentiality with participants, discussions intended to
underscore the complexity of the UMA's protections of mediation
confidentiality.53 While entertaining, it's a bit of a Trojan Horse. After all, just as
one does not need to know precisely how a clock works in order to tell time,
parties do not need to know every wrinkle of confidentiality law in order to
participate safely and effectively in a mediation.

a. Comparedto what?
Professor Shannon's introduction would imply that holders of other privileges
go into similar detail about the scope of their confidentiality protections, and in
this way holds the mediation privilege to a different, higher standard than those
other privileges.
The attorney-client privilege, with which the UMA is most closely aligned,
provides a good example. By Professor Shannon's standard for the UMA, he
would require that attorneys spell out in detail all of the exceptions and contours
of the attorney-client privilege - more than 1,000 pages worth of information in
the leading treatise 54 - such as what is and is not protected (communications vs.
information),55 how the privilege may be waived (express and implied),56 the
crime/fraud exception, 57 and about the need to distinguish legal from non-legal
advice,58 to name just a few wrinkles. Similarly, they would have to provide
additional detailed information about the confidentiality of settlement discussions
under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and related state laws - exceptions that
include, for example, the use of settlement discussion communications for
purposes of impeachment at trial, among nearly a dozen others. 59 Finally, since
one never knows in what jurisdiction a privileged communication may be sought,
53. Shannon, Dancing,supra n. 11.
54. Paul Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States (West 1999).
55. Id. at §5.1.
56. Id. at §9.
57. Id. at §8.1-8.16.
58. Id. at §7.1-7.8.
59. Fed. R. Evid. 408 (2001). See Rogers & McEwen, supra, n. 12, at § 9:06 and cases cited therein;
see also Wayne D. Brazil, Protectingthe Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 Hastings L. J.
955 (detailing narrow reach of Rule 408); Draft Unif. Mediation Act § 5, cmt. 3(a).
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attorneys would need to provide this information for all fifty states under
Professor Shannon's standard for the UMA.
One might reasonably doubt whether current attorney-client discussions with
respect to the confidentiality of their communications engage this level of detail; I
certainly do. Experience tells me that to the extent that the issue comes up during
actual attorney-client discussions, attorneys are more likely to just say the
communications are confidential and privileged and cannot be used as evidence in
later legal proceedings - and to raise more specific cautions when appropriate as
client counseling progresses. 6°
Similarly, Professor Shannon's argument suggests that mediators today
provide clients with an accurate and comprehensive assessment of the current
state of the law. Again, this seems unlikely. Do mediators who practice today in
the twenty-five states that do not have a general law protecting the confidentiality
of all mediation communications really tell their clients that their mediation
communications are in all probability discoverable and admissible at trial? 61 Do
mediators who practice today in the twenty-five states that do have a general
mediation confidentiality statute fully inform their clients about the limitations of
those protections, such as to the criminal context, 62 to statements related only to
the mediation, 6 3 or to mediations conducted under court programs? 64 Do
mediators today really tell their clients that the confidentiality provisions in their
contractual agreements to mediate, and their post-mediation settlement
agreements, likely will not be enforceable in a court of law if the communication
is sought as evidence in a trial, and that the clause will only be enforceable as to
disclosures of mediation communications outside of legal proceedings? 65 Do
mediators today really tell their clients that even if the mediation communication
is protected in their state that it may not be protected in another state in which the
evidence might be sought, and that any differences between the laws of the two
jurisdictions would be decided according to complex conflicts of law principles?
66

Again, one would be surprised if current mediator disclosure practices
included this level of detail. More likely, one would expect that mediators would

60. Professor Shannon's hypothetical assumes that doctors explain in detail the vulnerable parties
exception to the physician-patient privilege. See John W. Strong et al., Evidence: Cases and Materials
990 (5th ed. 1995). It also assumes that priests tell their penitent that the privilege may only apply if
the disclosure is motivated by spiritual or penitential considerations. See Claudia G. Catalano, Subject
Matter and Waiver of PrivilegeCovering Communications to Clergy Member or Spiritual Adviser, 93
A.L.R.5th 327 (2001). One may reasonably doubt that a majority of these professionals engage in
these types of discussions. Most probably just say the communications are confidential.
61. Unif. Mediation Act, Prefatory Note cmts. 3 and 4 (2001) (analyzing and categorizing state
mediation confidentiality laws).
62. See e.g. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 1119 (West 2003).
63. See e.g. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code Ann. § 154.073 (a) (West 2003).
64. See e.g, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 44.102 (West 2002).
65. Agreements to keep information away from courts are routinely invalidated on public policy
grounds. See Rogers & McEwen, supra n. 12, at §9.23-9.25. See e.g. Lawson v. Brown's Day Care
Center, 172 Vt. 574, 575 fn. 2 (2001) (parties may not create evidentiary privilege by agreement).
66. See Ellen E. Deason, PredictableMediation Confidentiality in the U.S. FederalSystem, 17 Ohio
St. J. on Dis. Res. 239, 252-55 (2002) (discussing conflicts of law issues affecting mediation
confidentiality and the UMA).
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be more apt to say something to the effect of "what's said in this room stays in
this room."
This disparity between mediator practices and the state of the law actually
underscores one of the major benefits of the Uniform Mediation Act. Mediators
who speak to this kind of a general "right" of confidentiality do their clients a
great disservice - indeed, arguably mislead their clients - by setting client
expectations regarding mediation confidentiality at levels that cannot be legally
supported. The UMA, on the other hand, fills this gap by bringing the positive
law into alignment with party expectations regarding mediation confidentiality. In
states in which the UMA is adopted, when a mediator says "the statements you
make in this mediation are confidential and will generally not be admissible in a
court of law if this mediation fails," the UMA provides the parties the tools to
back that up: a statutory legal right to tell a court you refuse to provide that
information, and to prevent someone else from disclosing it without your
permission.67
b. A complex problem, not a complex act
In many respects, the UMA is a remarkably clear document as finally drafted,
having been washed clean on the rocks of more than a dozen drafts and drafting
sessions. For example, the operative provision of the Act says: "(a) Except as
otherwise provided in Section 6, a mediation communication is privileged as
provided in subsection (b) and is not subject to discovery or admissible in
evidence in a proceeding unless waived or precludedas provided by Section 5." 68
This is a fairly straightforward declarative sentence, one that does not even use
many big words. 69 It says what the general rule is in a way that is understandable
and familiar to both lawyers and non-lawyers, 71 and tells precisely where to find
72
exceptions to this general rule.
Even the Act's most complicated provisions - the blocking rights of
mediation participants - are written in plain English, providing:
(b) In a proceeding, the following privileges apply:

67. It should be noted that the non-party participant's right to block mediation communications are
limited to statements that the non-party participant makes. This preserves party autonomy by
permitting parties to waive the privilege with respect to their own statements without needing to secure
the permission of the non-party participant, and avoiding the indefensible situation of a non-party
participant blocking the use of mediation communications by the parties.
68. Unif. Mediation Act § 4(a) (2001). It may seem odd to begin the sentence with reference to
exceptions, but this is consistent with NCCUSL style for all uniform laws. See NCCUSL, Procedural
and Drafting Manual, Rule 13(a) (1997).
69. At forty words, it is consistent with a length that general interest newspapers typically consider
appropriate for general readers, who are assumed to be able to read at an eighth grade level. See
Rudolph F. Flesch, How to Test Readibility 1-6 (1951); Brian S. Brooks et al., News Reporting and
Writing 149-51 (6th ed., Bedford/St. Martin's 1999) (continuing to endorse Flesch standards).
70. The word "privilege" was directed at legal readers of the statute. Unif. Mediation Act § 4(a).
71. The phrase "is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence in a proceeding" was directed
at non-lawyer readers of the statute.
72. See generally Unif. Mediation Act § 6 (2001) (exceptions to general rule of privilege); Unif.
Mediation Act § 5 (2001) (waiver and preclusion).
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(1) A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other
person from disclosing, a mediation communication.
(2) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and
may prevent any other person from disclosing a mediation
communication of the mediator.
(3) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any
other person73from disclosing, a mediation communication of the nonparty
participant.
Again, this is hardly the kind of legalese that so often infests our statutes.
Still, two facts contribute to the appearance of complexity. First, the environment
in which this fairly straightforward rule operates is itself complex - complicated
by the different types of mediation applications and styles, complicated by the
competing and sometimes trumping demands of the justice system for relevant
mediation communications evidence, complicated by the unique needs of the
mediation process. On the latter point, for example, the mediation privilege is
unique among other privileges in that it does not permit waiver by conduct; rather,
waiver of the privilege must be express.74 This was because of concerns about
inadvertent waivers by parties or mediators, especially non-lawyers, vitiating the
privilege.
The second reason for the appearance of complexity is that the UMA, is more
responsible than other "less complex" statutes because it clearly addresses the
difficult questions - just what is a mediation, when does it begin and end, what
does confidentiality really mean, when should support for mediation
confidentiality give way to larger public concerns - rather than leaving them to
the courts. This was a deliberate decision, intended to provide clarity and
certainty for mediation participants.
c. Choosing specificity over brevity
In the drafting of any statute, one must make fundamental choices about what
matters to address specifically, and what matters, if any, to leave to judicial
interpretation. A more specific statute will necessarily be, or will appear to be,
more complex, but at the same time it will leave less discretion to the courts and
provide parties more certainty. In contrast, a less specific statute will appear to be
simpler, but it will be less certain and reliable because it leaves much more room
for judicial interpretation.
This is one area in which cultural differences among mediation constituencies
made a significant difference.
Responding to criticisms of early drafts for
complexity, the Drafting Committees adopted the recommendation of the
Academic Advisory Faculty 75 for an approach to confidentiality that was very

73. Unif. Mediation Act § 4(b) (2001).
74. Unif. Mediation Act, § 5(a)(1) (2001).
75. This faculty was composed almost exclusively of law professors. See supra n. 25.
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similar to the Texas model: a broad general statement of confidentiality 76 stating
that mediations communications would be privileged from admission into
evidence unless such exclusion would constitute a "manifest injustice. '77 This
78
approach tracked the rule for mediations involving the
79 federal government, and
Texas.
in
including
has some precedent in the states,
1. Manifest injustice
Lawyers involved in the drafting process were generally willing to trust
courts to implement a "manifest injustice" provision narrowly, in accordance with
the strong presumption of non-admissibility reflected in the statute's legislative
intent. However, a "manifest injustice" exception was patently unacceptable to the
mediation community (including many lawyer-mediators). Indeed, while the
mediation community rarely spoke with one voice on any given issue, this was the
one issue upon which the overwhelming majority of mediators and provider
organizations agreed.
Articulations varied, but they boiled down to an
unwillingness to trust courts to apply the "manifest injustice" standard narrowly.
Instead, they feared the "manifest injustice" provision as "an exception that would
swallow the rule," one "so big that you could drive a truck through it." 80 The
mediators involved in the process lobbied the drafting committees hard to limit
judicial discretion at every instance - even at the acknowledged cost of the
additional drafting, or "complexity," that would be required to achieve that goal. 8'
The drafters resisted, trying different formulations that would preserve but
constrain what they viewed as inevitable judicial interpretation, but the mediators
involved in the process made it clear that "manifest injustice" was an issue upon
which there would be no compromise. In the end, the drafters relented, deleted
the "manifest injustice" provision, and proceeded to draft a more specific - and
longer - statute.82
Professor Shannon effectively raises this issue again when he holds out the
Texas statute, Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 154.073(a), as a better approach to the
more complex privilege structure adopted by the UMA. 83 In relevant parts, the
Texas law provides:

76. The most significant difference is that the UMA even then distinguished between discovery and
admissibility in legal proceedings and disclosures outside of proceedings.
77. Draft Unif. Mediation Act (June 1999) <http://www.nccusl.org> (accessed Apr. 8, 2003).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(4)(A) (2003).
79. See e.g. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code Ann. § 154.073(e)(West 2003); Cal. Evid. Code Ann.
§ 1119; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2914 (2002).
80. See e.g. Letter from Liz O'Brien, president, California Dispute Resolution Council, to Richard
C. Reuben, Reporter, ABA UMA Drafting Committee (Aug. 5, 1999) (would create "an impossible
environment in which to mediate").
81. It is ironic, but telling, that some of these mediators may today criticize the UMA as too
complex.

82. See Draft Unif. Mediation Act (Dec. 1999) <http://www.nccusl.org> (accessed Apr. 8, 2003);
Memo. from Richard C. Reuben, Reporter, ABA UMA Drafting Committee, to Friends of the
Mediation Law Project, Changes to the June 1999 Draft (copy on file with author).
83. See Shannon, Dancing, supra n. 11. Texas also has another general mediation confidentiality
statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code Ann. § 154.053(c ) ("unless the parties agree otherwise, all
matters, including the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their counsel during the settlement
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A communication relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal
dispute made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution
procedure, whether before or after the institution of formal judicial
proceedings, is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be
used as evidence againstthe participantin any judicial or administrative
proceeding.84
This statute is somewhat representative of the simple "mediation is
confidential" statutes found in some state statutes and court rules. While such
statutes are seductive in their simplicity, they are deceptive in that they raise more
questions than they answer, promise much more than they deliver, and in the end
contribute little to the reliability of mediation confidentiality. At worst, they are
downright misleading. In my view, Professor Shannon is correct in contending
that the Texas statute provides a good case in point, and therefore is worth a closer
look.
2. Ambiguity in the Texas statute
As is typical among these "mediation is confidential" statutes, the Texas law
conveniently avoids the harder questions that are likely to lead to litigation. For
example, while stating that alternative dispute resolution processes are
"confidential," the statute does not define what an "alternative dispute resolution
proceeding" is for purposes of the act, nor does it define "confidential," nor does it
define its express limitation to communications that "relate to the subject matter"
of the dispute,
nor does it list any exceptions to its general rule of
85
confidentiality.
Professor Shannon and the other members of the ADR Section of the State
Bar of Texas interpret this broad language to provide both a categorical rule
against the discovery or introduction of mediation communications evidence in
subsequent judicial and administrative proceedings (with no exceptions 86), as well
as a categorical rule against disclosure of mediation communications outside of
proceedings (with no exceptions).
Maybe. But we all know that wishing does not necessarily make something
so - and there are strong judicial pressures against such an interpretation. Rules
of evidentiary exclusion are construed narrowly, in keeping with the law's
demand for every person's evidence in the pursuit of justice. 87 While it is
theoretically possible that a court may view the statute as providing these two

process, are confidential and may never be disclosed to anyone, including the appointing court"). My
analysis focuses on § 154.073, as that appears to be Professor Shannon's focus.
84. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code Ann. § 154.073(a) (emphasis added).
85. The statute does provide that mediation communications are admissible if they are "admissible
or discoverable independent of the procedure." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code Ann.
§154.073(c) (West 2003).
86. Id.
87. See supra, n. 47. See e.g. Sharon Motor Lodge v. Tai, 2001 WL 1659516 (2001) (construing
state statute as permitting mediator to be required to answer interrogatories on the question of whether
there was a mediated settlement agreement, and the terms of that agreement).
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bright line rules, it is only a possibility, it is not a rule of law.88 An equally
plausible, and more defensible, judicial reading of the statute's plain language,
would seem to compel a more restrictive interpretation - as a relatively narrow
evidentiary exclusion for certain statements made during a mediation. In fact, no
Texas court to date has construed the statute as being either without exceptions
with regard to admissibility of mediation communications in legal proceedings, or
as imposing an affirmative duty not to disclose outside of legal proceedings. To
abundantly clear
the contrary, the relatively extensive case law in Texas makes
89
that the list of unstated judicial exceptions can be extensive.
Texas' own experience with judicially carved exceptions is consistent with
that of other states. Courts have generally refused to categorically exclude
mediation communications from admissibility. 90 Rather, courts have viewed such
"mediation is confidential" statutes as requiring them to balance the mediation
confidentiality interests against the parties' interest in the evidence in the case
before them - frequently deciding in favor of admissibility. 9' California remains
the best example, as its statutory scheme lays out a categorical "mediation is
confidential" rule to the use of mediation communications in subsequent civil
proceedings. Yet both state and federal courts in California have regularly found
exceptions92 that would permit the admission of mediation communications
evidence.
While it is not emphasized in Professor Shannon's analysis, Texas law goes
one step further in limiting the scope of mediation confidentiality, providing a
broad statutory exception to the broad general rule of confidentiality (whatever it
is finally construed to mean). It is found in Subsection (e), and provides:
If this section conflicts with other legal requirements for disclosure of
communications, records, or materials, the issue of confidentiality may
be presented to the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings to
determine, in camera, whether the facts, circumstances, and context of
the communications or materials sought to be disclosed warrant a
88, Unif. Mediation Act § 9, cmt.(a).
89. See e.g. Guevara v. Sahoo, 2001 WL 700517 (Tex. App. Dallas June 22, 2001) (upholding trial
court sanction based on a mediation communication); Randle v. Mid Gulf Inc., 1996 WL 447954 (Tex.
App. Houston Aug. 8, 1996) (rejecting confidentiality arguments in permitting evidence that mediated
settlement agreement was signed under duress); In re GrandJury Subpoena dated Dec. 17, 1996, 148
F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting confidentiality arguments and permitting federal government access
to agriculture mediation program records).
90. See Rinaker v. Super. Ct., 62 Cal. App. 4th 155 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1998) (juvenile's
constitutional right to confrontation in civil juvenile delinquency trumps mediator's statutory right not
to be called as a witness); Olam v. Cong. Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(construing California statutory scheme as establishing a mediation privilege, and ruling that the
mediator's right to testify gives way when both parties agree to waive the privilege, and the court
determines it needs the evidence to decide the parties' claims); Foxgate Homeowners Assn. v.
Bramalea California,Inc., 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001) (reversing court of appeals decision that portions
of a mediator's report about sanctionable conduct, along with evidence of statements made during the
mediation relating to that conduct, may be considered by a court when ruling on the sanctions motion).
91. See e.g. Fed. R. Evid. 402 (relevancy); Folb v. Motion PictureIndustry Pension & Health Plans,
16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (balancing needs of confidentiality in mediation against
common law presumption of availability of evidence in and recognizing a mediation privilege under
Fed. R. Evid. 501).
92. Supra n. 90.
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protective order of the court
or whether the communications or materials
93
are subject to disclosure.

On its face, this exception is clearly broader than the proposed "manifest
injustice" standard vilified by UMA critics in the early drafting. 94 Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine how one might draft a broader exception than Subsection (e).
A more accurate description of Texas law might be: "Mediation communications
are confidential unless a court wants to hear them." And courts in Texas arguably more than in other states - have repeatedly shown themselves prone to
wanting that information. 95 For this reason, categorical mediation confidentiality
statutes have been frequent targets of scholarly criticism, including the Texas
statute in particular.9 6 For this reason, too, state legislatures have been reluctant to

enact such rules, overwhelmingly preferring the privilege structure adopted by the
UMA. 97

3. The title of the UMA is misleading
Professor Shannon criticizes the UMA for not getting into other aspects of
mediation, such as qualifications.98 This echoes another criticism heard during the
latter stages of drafting: that the title of the legislation - the Uniform Mediation
Act - is misleading because the Act is essentially an evidentiary privilege and
discovery limitation. 99 This criticism is just incorrect on its face.
93. Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 154.073(e)
94. Compare Draft Unif. Mediation Act § 2(c)(5) (June 1999) "...
if a court determines, after a
hearing, that disclosure is necessary to prevent a manifest injustice of such a magnitude as to outweigh
the importance of protecting the confidentiality of mediation communications" with Texas Civ. Prac.
& Rem. § 154.073(e), supra n. 93.
95. See supra n. 89 and cases cited therein.
96. See e.g. Eric Galton and Kimberlee Kovach, Texas ADR: A Future So Bright We Gotta Wear
Shades, 31 St. Mary's L.J. 949, 967 (2000) (noting "inconsistency within the statute itself as well the
actual and potential conflicts with other legal and ethical requirements," and criticizing the judicial
balancing provision for failure to provide standards to guide judicial discretion); Edward F. Sherman,
Confidentiality in ADR Proceedings: Policy Issues Arising from the Texas Experience, 38 S. Tex. L.
Rev. 541, 573 (1997) (stressing instances in which mediation confidentiality may be at "cross
purposes" with other significant state policies, such as requirements for disclosure of child abuse).
97. Indeed, the privilege structure has been used by 21 out of 25 states that have general mediation
confidentiality protections. See Unif. Mediation Act, § 4 cmt. 2(a). In some of those states, the courts
have interpreted categorical confidentiality statutes as creating a privilege. See e.g, Olam, 68 F. Supp.
2d at 1130 (general rule of mediation confidentiality "has the effect of making the mediator a holder of
an independent privilege").
98. See Shannon, Dancing, supra n. 11. Moreover, as a point of fact, qualifications are addressed in
the UMA in a non-intrusive but significant way. Section 9 (c ) requires a mediator to disclose
qualifications if asked. Unif. Mediation Act § 9 (c). Citing an ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, the
Comments to this section further make clear that no single profession or background qualifies one as a
mediator, including that of law. Id.
99. See Gregory Hoffman & Elayne Greenberg, The Uniform Mediation Act and Mediation in New
York, Report of the State Bar of New York Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 24-25
(Nov. 1, 2002) <www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Attomey_Resources/NYSBA_.Reports/
2002_reportsjlinks-page.htm> (for PDF download) (accessed Mar. 12, 2003). These concerns were
found insubstantial by the New York State Bar Board of Governors, which voted unanimously to
endorse the UMA. Justin Kelly, New York Bar Leadership Recommends Adoption of Mediation Act
<www.adrworld.com/opendocument.asp?Doc=q2d6jHIa9T&code=OCEBa5xR> (last accessed Mar.
12,2003).
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It is clearly true that the centerpiece of the UMA is an evidentiary privilege
that permits a party, mediator, or nonparty participant to refuse to provide
evidence of, and to block the introduction of evidence of, mediation
communications in formal legal proceedings.'00 However, there are several other
provisions that are substantially unrelated to the privilege, including provisions
that generally provide participants in mediation with some legal assurance of
minimal process integrity. For example, the UMA includes a requirement that
mediators disclose reasonably known conflicts of interests to parties as soon as the
conflict is recognized. 10 1 Similarly, the Act also assures parties in mediation a
right to be accompanied by counsel or support persons.' 02 Finally, independent of
the privilege, the UMA bars mediators from providing substantive reports about
the mediation to judges and other authorities.' 03
As the Comments have long reflected, part of the collaboration agreement
between NCCUSL and the ABA was that the drafting committees would draft
only a "core" act at first, one that would be initially offered to the states only with
those issues upon which uniformity seemed immediately necessary and which
could survive the political process of UMA drafting and public vetting.' 4 This
decision favoring a constrained approach rather than omnibus legislation reflected
the need for caution in drafting laws related to mediation, for such laws must
account for and respect the differences in mediation styles and practices that
would make uniformity inappropriate. This reflects an appreciation for the nuance
with which mediation legislation must operate if it is to be well-crafted and
constructive rather than clumsy and destructive. As Hippocrates wisely
admonished, "First, do no harm. ' ' 05 The collaboration agreement between
NCCUSL and the ABA that led to the partnership explicitly anticipated that the
various ABA sections might wish to consider developing legislation on specific
areas of mediation - such as peer mediation, criminal justice mediation, and
international mediation - that could be forwarded to the NCCUSL Drafting
Committee as possible amendments to the core Uniform Mediation Act. 10 6 But
such suggestions for mediation-context-specific amendments to the UMA need
not come only from or through the ABA. Indeed, at the request of UNCITRAL,
NCCUSL reauthorized the UMA Drafting Committee in August 2002 to draft a
model provision that would square the UMA with the recently enacted
UNCITRAL Model Rule for International 07Commercial Conciliations. As of this
writing, those drafting efforts are ongoing. 1

100. See Unif. Mediation Act §§ 4-6.
101. Unif. Mediation Act § 9.
102. Unif. Mediation Act § 10.
103. Unif. Mediation Act § 7.
104. See Unif. Mediation Act, PrefatoryNote.
105. See Hippocrates,Epidemics, Bk. 1, § XI (Harv. U. Press 1994).
106. To be sure, the drafting committees and the Academic Advisory Faculty considered several other
issues as possible topics of inclusion within the UMA - including immunity and the summary
enforcement of mediated settlement agreements. All of those issues fell out of the Act over time. See
Memorandum from Richard C. Reuben, Reporter, ABA UMA Drafting Committee, to Friends of the
Mediation Law Project, Changes to the June 1999 Draft (Nov. 16, 1999) (copy on file with
author)(deletion of immunity); see Unif. Mediation Act (deleting summary enforcement of mediated
settlement agreements).
107. For more on the UNCITRAL Model Rule, see Sekolec and Getty articles in this volume.
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One suspects both legislators and mediators over time will appreciate the
decision to approach the question of uniformity in the law of mediation on an
issue-by-issue basis.
4. The UMA will never be uniform (so why bother)
A third generalized grievance is that the UMA should be rejected because its
goal of uniformity will be impossible to achieve. It is probably true that the UMA
will not be enacted precisely as written in all fifty states, and by all federal courts
through appropriate court rules. But this hardly seems reason to oppose the Act.
In fact, no piece of uniform law has ever been adopted uniformly by all fifty states
- not even the much heralded Uniform Commercial Code.10 8 Rather, the goal is
substantial uniformity among the states that wish to adopt the uniform law.
To be sure, the drafters hope that the Act will be broadly adopted, particularly
by the many states that have less developed confidentiality laws. However, most
uniform laws require some tinkering to fit within the fabric of existing state law,
and the Uniform Mediation Act is no different in this regard. Indeed, as discussed
further below,' °9 the drafters conceived of the act as a law to complement rather
than displace existing state laws, to the extent such laws exist at all, and0
occasionally use Legislative Notes to underscore this drafting assumption.''
Again, the goal is substantial uniformity among the states that wish to adopt the
UMA. Professor Shannon's analysis criticizes the UMA for allowing states this
flexibility on certain issues, such as the regulation of mediation communications
outside of proceedings."' More commonly, though, this is viewed as a strength of
the UMA, not a weakness, as it permits states to integrate the UMA into their
current law with minimal disruption, while at the same time providing a broad
framework of uniformity in mediation upon which the public at large can
reasonably rely.
B. Criticisms of what is in the UMA
It is a testament to the drafting process that there are relatively few criticisms
about what is actually in the UMA. Again, I will focus on three of these relatively
minor criticisms: the Act's requirement that mediators disclose their reasonably
known conflicts of interest, the fact that some exceptions are subject to an in
camera evidentiary hearing before the evidence may be admitted, and the Act's
distinction between felony and misdemeanors for purposes of the admissibility of
mediation communications evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings. Again,
all three issues were the subject of intense discussions among drafters over an
extended period of time.
108. For example, as of Sept. 30, 2000, New York had refused to enact Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC,
and South Carolina had yet to enact Articles 2A and 3. See NCCUSL, 2000-2001 Reference Book 116.
109. See infra nn. 160-71.
110. See e.g. Unif. Mediation Act § 3, Legislative Note (urging state judiciaries to consider adopting
conforming court rules); Unif. Mediation Act § 4, Legislative Note (making clear that UMA does not
preempt state statutes that make mediators incompetent to testify, or that provide for costs and attorney
fees to mediators who are wrongfully subpoenaed).
I 11. See Shannon, Dancing, supra n. 11.
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1. The mediator's obligationto disclose conflicts of interest
Section 9 of the UMA requires mediators to disclose reasonably known
conflicts of interest, and makes clear that this obligation of the mediator is a
continuing one that lasts throughout the mediation." 12 Even though this
requirement is consistent with the ethical obligations already incumbent upon
mediators under all professional standards,' 3 a few mediators - led by the
International Academy of Mediators - vigorously opposed this provision during
4
the drafting, and continue to articulate this as the basis for their opposition."
The thrust of this criticism is two-fold: disclosure should be an ethical
obligation, and not a legal requirement created by statute; second, that the remedy
suggested by the statute - that the mediator who fails to disclose reasonably
known conflicts of interest be precluded from being able to assert the privilege is inappropriate. Neither criticism has been persuasive.
Unlike lawyers, doctors, accountants, plumbers, barbers, indeed most other
professionals, most mediators are subject to no oversight by the state." 5 They are
not subject to licensure before being permitted to practice, nor are they
accountable to professional standards as they practice apart from the possibility of
malpractice.1 6 While this lack of accountability is not necessarily an argument in
favor of taking these steps, it does heighten consumer protection concerns - 7
especially when the practices of some mediators seem particularly questionable."
Such special treatment would seem to be justifiable only if there was at least some
minimal assurance for process integrity for mediations afforded such protections.
In this regard, the drafters again took a minimalist approach and recognized
that the most fundamental of consumer protection assurances is that the person
entrusted to mediate disputes will not have an incentive to favor either side in the

112. Unif. Mediation Act § 9(a).
113. See e.g Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Stand. III (AAAIABA/Socy. of Prof. in
Dispute Res. 1995); Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, Stand. V
(AAA/ABA/Socy. of Prof. in Dispute Res. 2001); National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation
Programs, Stand. 8.1(b) (AAA/ABA/Socy. of Prof. in Dispute Res. 1992); see also Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act § 12 (2000); Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management
Disputes § 2(B) (Natl. Acad. Of Arb./AAA/Fed. Mediation and Conciliation Serv. 1985) (required
disclosures).
114. See Resolution of the International Academy of Mediators Opposing Adoption of the Uniform
Mediation Act (Oct. 31, 2001) (copy on file with author) <www.texasadr.org/umaresolutionopposed.
pdf> (for PDF download) (accessed Mar. 12, 2003). Professor Shannon correctly notes that the
Pennsylvania Bar Association adopted a resolution that was similar to the LAM resolution in this
regard. The two may seem like odd bedfellows - until one realizes that the same person, Pittsburgh
attorney mediator Robert Creo, played a pivotal role in the development of the positions of both
organizations. This was clearly a minority position among mediators, as the endorsements of all of the
major dispute resolution providers and professional organizations well demonstrates. See supra n. 2.
115. Some states, such as Florida and Indiana, have mediator disciplinary systems. See Fla. Stat. Ann.
Mediator R. 10.700 (2000); S.D.Ind. Disciplinary Enforcement A.D.R. Rule 3.0, et seq. (2000).
116. It is worth noting that mediators lobbied strenuously for the UMA to include an immunity
provision as well. There was no support on the drafting committees for that proposition. To the
contrary, the Drafting Committees at one point included a bracketed model provision that would have
restated current law by making it clear that mediators could not include waivers of liability in their
contracts. Draft Unif. Mediation Act §4(b) (June 1999).
117. See e.g. Randle v. Mid Gulf Inc., 1996 WL 447954 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. Aug. 8, 1996)
(party not permitted break despite complaint of chest pains and dizziness).
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resolution of that dispute. 118 However, they also recognized that complete
impartiality may be an unattainable goal in light of the various cognitive biases
that social scientists, and dispute resolution scholars and professionals, have come
to recognize are experienced by all humans." 9 Further, there may be reasons why
parties may prefer, even need, to have as a mediator someone with whom they
know they have a pre-existing or on-going relationship. Therefore, consistent
with the principle of informed consent that undergirds the act as a whole, the
drafters concluded that this process integrity value was best implemented through
a disclosure requirement that puts the burden on the mediator to identify and
disclose the potential conflict of interest, and then permits the parties to waive the
conflict if they so desire.
The International Academy of Mediators and a few other mediators have
complained of the administrative burden that a disclosure requirement would
make.120 Even so, the requirement, and its articulation, were not difficult issues for
the drafters. 12 ' The more difficult issue was what the sanction would be for a
breach of this duty to disclose reasonably known conflicts of interest. The drafters
considered many different options, including civil and criminal penalties, before
deciding on a bracketed provision recommending to the states a narrowly tailored
remedy of precluding the mediator from asserting the privilege if he or she failed
to disclose a reasonably known conflict of interest. This remedy draws largely on
the longstanding principle of "unclean hands" embedded in the UMA's waiver
and preclusion provisions, 122 leaves intact the privilege protections of other
mediation participants, and recognizes that the preclusion is most likely to come
into play in a proceeding against the mediator, which is excepted under Section
6(a)(5) anyway. As the UMA comments make clear, states are free to impose
more severe sanctions than the loss23of mediator privilege if they are dissatisfied
with the drafters' recommendation.1

118. See e.g. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (holding
that state agency regulating optometry that is composed of independent optometrists is biased in
proceedings against optometrists who work for corporations because they have a pecuniary interest in
limiting entry into the field and excluding chain stores). For a discussion of due process requirements
that may inure to mediations conducted under color of state authority, such as a court-related mediation
program, see Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 949, 1091-99 (2000).
119. See generally, Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames (2000); Scott
Pious, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (1993); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of
Disputant Concerns in Mediation, 3 Negotiation J. 367, 368 (1987); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski
& Andrew J. Wistrick, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777 (2001). For further
discussion, see infra nn. 172-177 and accompanying text on impartiality.
120. Surely attorneys have been able to get along with similar obligations, to the benefit of the
profession.
121. In yet another effort to work with the mediation community, the drafters initially approved this
section as a bracketed provision, meaning that it would be offered to the states as an optional model
provision. However, the Uniform Law Commission ordered the brackets deleted, and the provision to
be made uniform, as a condition of its final approval. See Letter of Robert Mussehl, Chair, ABA Sec.
of Dispute Res., to ABA Sec. Chairs, (Oct. 4, 2001) (copy on file with author).
122. See Unif. Mediation Act, § 5.
123. See Unif. Mediation Act, § 9 cmt. 3(a).
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2. Criticisms relatingto the exceptions to the general rule of
inadmissibility

As a matter of general legislative drafting, exceptions to general rules often
provide the greatest capacity for disagreement. In this regard, the UMA is again
fairly remarkable in that the list of UMA privilege exceptions have been
substantially uncontroversial.
While noteworthy, this is not surprising. The UMA exceptions are narrowly
tailored to address specific issues and are generally consistent with exceptions that
are commonly found in state mediation confidentiality statutes. Therefore they
may be seen as reflecting some degree of consensus about public policy norms
with respect to the admissibility of mediation communications evidence for the
purposes covered in each exception. 124 Still, Professor Shannon raises at least two
questions about the exceptions that are worth a response. One question relates to
the disparity in treatment between the exceptions listed in Section 6(a), the
application of which does not require an evidentiary hearing, and those listed in
Section 6(b), which must be established during an in camera evidentiary
proceeding before the evidence sought can be admitted into evidence. The second
question concerns Section 6(b)(1)'s distinction between the admission of
mediation communications evidence in subsequent felony and criminal cases.
a. Sections 6(a) and 6(b): "Above the line" and "below the line"
exceptions
Section 6 of the UMA distinguishes between two categories of exceptions,
with Section 6(a) coming to be known during the drafting as the "above the line"
exceptions and Section 6(b) exceptions coming to be known as the "below the
line" exceptions.
The exceptions to the general rule of privilege in Section 6 reflect the
drafters' recognition that society's interests in the confidentiality of mediation
communications are sometimes outweighed by broader societal interests in the
availability of evidence when necessary to achieve justice in a particular case.
The "above the line" exceptions represent those situations in which the justice
system's need for the evidence may be said to categorically outweigh its interest
in the confidentiality of mediation communications such that it would be either
unnecessary or impractical for the parties, and administratively inefficient for the
court system to hold a full evidentiary hearing on the applicability of the
exception. These "above the line" exceptions include the ability to use the
mediated settlement agreement as evidence in a subsequent action for its
breach, 25 as well as mediation communications that are made during a mediation

124. In all fairness, the UMA has received criticism from some for having "too many" exceptions.
See e.g. Shannon, Dancing, supra n. 11. However, those who make this criticism give no hint as to
which of the current exceptions they would delete as inappropriate. One suspects that the answer may
often lead to a preference for a categorical rule of inadmissibility with no exceptions, which is simply
unrealistic.
125. Unif. Mediation Act § 6(a)(1).
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that is already made public by state open meetings and open records laws," 26 that
provide evidence of credible threats of violence during a mediation,' 2 7 that are
used to further a crime, 28 that are used to establish a misconduct or malpractice
complaint against a mediator,' 29 or that are offered to prove the abuse of a
vulnerable party.' 30 As many states already have recognized, in these narrow
circumstances, society's interest in the information clearly outweighs its interest
in barring the admissibility of mediation communications evidence, and if
applicable, should not require an additional judicial determination before the
mediation communication may be received into evidence.
In contrast, the two "below the line" exceptions of Section 6(b) make it more
difficult to introduce mediation communications evidence in situations in which
the evidence may be desirable, but does not necessarily outweigh the state's
policy favoring the confidentiality of mediation communications. In these
situations, the UMA requires courts to determine whether the mediation
communications evidence should be admitted. Crucially, Section 6(b) specifies
precisely how judges are to strike this balance, and places a thumb on the
confidentiality side of the scale by limiting the admissibility to situations in which
the evidence is otherwise unavailable and the need for it in the case at bar
"substantially outweighs" the state's interest in preserving the confidentiality of
31
mediation.'
The two "below the, line" exceptions are limited to mediation32
communications that are used to establish guilt or innocence in a felony matter,1
or that are used to establish the contractual validity of the mediated settlement
agreement itself.' 33 In both situations, the state's interest in the information and
the parties' interest in confidentiality are equally strong. In the felony context, the
exception permits evidence affecting someone's physical liberty, and possibly
their life, as well as the public's interest in safety and the enforcement of society's
most serious criminal laws - if that evidence is really necessary in the case and is
otherwise unavailable. Similarly, the contractual validity exception permits a
party to a mediation to establish that his or her assent to the mediated settlement
agreement did not meet traditional standards for contractual assent - for example,
that it was induced by fraud or duress. 34 Judicial gatekeeping and a high standard
of proof are still appropriate for both exceptions because of the potential for abuse
that would undermine the larger goal of mediation confidentiality, and to promote
the reasonable expectations of the parties.
126. Unif. Mediation Act § 6(a)(2). This exception essentially defers to, and therefore leaves in place,
state and local open records and open meetings laws.
127. Unif. Mediation Act § 6(a)(3).
128. Unif. Mediation Act § 6(a)(4).
129. Unif. Mediation Act §§ 6(a)(5) and (6).
130. Unif. Mediation Act § 6(a)(7).
13 1. This is in contrast with the standardless conferrals of judicial discretion in Texas and other states
that have simple confidentiality statutes.
132. Unif. Mediation Act § 6(b)(l). For further discussion, see infra n. 135-137.
133. Unif. Mediation Act § 6(b)(2).
134. See Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 28.13-28.25 (fraud); 28.2-28.8 (duress) (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., rev. ed., West 1993); see also Scott Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled
Go the Privileges, 85 Marquette L. Rev. 9 (2001) (generally raising concerns about fraudulently
induced mediated settlement agreements). Professor Shannon supports this exception. See Shannon,
Dancing, supra n. 11.
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b. The felony-misdemeanor distinction
Professor Shannon criticizes the "below the line" criminal law exception for
felonies because it distinguishes between felonies and misdemeanors. 135 This
criticism reflects a basic confusion with regard to this exception.
First, it must be remembered that the exception is to a general rule of
inadmissibility- meaning that mediation communications remain confidential and
inadmissible for misdemeanors under the exception (which means many if not
most criminal cases in which a party may seek to introduce mediation
communications evidence). They are only subject to admissibility under the strict
balancing test to establish guilt or innocence in felonies - those crimes that society
deems to be its most serious, where the consequences are greatest for both the
individual and the state. Thus this exception shades toward confidentiality
generally, while at the same time recognizing the unique needs of the criminal
context.
Second, the Act gives states the option of including misdemeanors within this
exception if they so desire as a matter of policy.' 36 The drafters declined to take
this step because adding misdemeanors to the exception would have the effect of
diminishing, not increasing, mediation confidentiality. Moreover, they were
particularly concerned about potentially undermining the many successful victimoffender mediation programs by making victim-offender mediations more
vulnerable to invasion for evidence in subsequent prosecutions.' 37 Out of respect
for these programs, and an Act-wide drafting philosophy of keeping
encroachments on mediation confidentiality to a minimum, the drafters elected to
leave the question of misdemeanors to states to decide under the policies,
practices, and traditions of their own criminal laws.

C. Criticisms of what is not in the UMA
The final set of criticisms are those that address issues or positions not
included within the UMA. The three biggest issues' 38 are the drafters' decision
not to place an affirmative duty of confidentiality outside the context of legal
proceedings, not to expand the definition of mediation communications to include
mediator observations and mental impressions, and not to draft a notice
135. See Shannon, Dancing, supra n. 11.
136. Unif. Mediation Act § 6(b)(1). The bracketed words "[or misdemeanor]" gives this option to the
states. See NCCUSL, Proceduraland DraftingManual 26, Rule 21 and Comment (1997).
137. It is worth stressing that the exception does not apply to statements made during mediations
conducted under victim-offender programs. Rather, it only applies to subsequent felony prosecutions
in which statements made during victim-offender mediations may be sought to be introduced into
evidence (by either the prosecution or the defense). The exception does not permit the introduction of
victim-offender mediation communications in a subsequent misdemeanor prosecution unless the state
decides to include misdemeanors within the exception. For a seminal compilation of research and
practice guides on victim offender mediation, see Mark S. Umbreit, The Handbook of Victim Offender
Mediation: An Essential Guide to Practice & Research (Jossey-Bass 2001).
138. Professor Joseph B. Stulberg also raises questions about the exclusion of mediations conducted
under federal collective bargaining agreements in § 3(b)(1), and of peer mediations in § 3(b)(4)(A).
Stulberg, supra n. 6. Because these issues have not been raised by others, I will limit my response to
the official comments to those provisions.
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requirement for invoking the privilege. 139 The drafters considered these issues at
length over an extended period of time, and rejected them as too novel for a
uniform law. The affirmative duty and expanded definition of mediation
communications would have cut new law, raising an untolled number of questions
about their applicability and exceptions. This in turn would probably, and
justifiably, affect enactability in some states. Similarly, a notice requirement
would have inappropriately intruded upon state and local rules and customs. That
said, individual states are free to draft0 in these areas without affecting the
fundamental thrust of UMA uniformity.14
1. No duty of confidentiality outside of proceedingsbeyond contract
The Uniform Mediation Act does not include an affirmative duty - or gag rule
- on mediators and parties that would prevent them from disclosing what was said
in the mediation outside of the context of proceedings. Rather, it follows current
law and mediation's fundamental premise of self-determination in leaving nonproceeding disclosures to contract - which is to say, to the good judgment of the
parties to determine in light of the unique facts and circumstances surrounding the
matter under dispute. 14'
This was a very difficult issue for the Drafting Committees throughout the
four-year drafting effort, essentially because they agreed with the many
commentators on this issue that confidentiality outside the context of formal court
proceedings is an important value to mediation. Yet, in the end, they concluded
that confidentiality outside of proceedings was142not an issue upon which uniform
law was necessary, appropriate, or practicable.
Particularly persuasive were the concerns that courts would likely impose
civil liability when individuals disclosed mediation communications (even
inadvertently) as a consequence of the violation of such a duty, and that the duty
was unworkable given basic human nature and the often felt need that people have
to talk about their disputes (and the resolution of those disputes). 143 For example,
mediation parties with no idea that state law imposed such a duty might
innocently discuss the mediation with a neighbor, only to learn when they were
139. See NYSB Report, supra note 99, at 14-17.
140. For further discussion, see infra nn. 146-155, and accompanying text.
141. Research for the UMA uncovered no statutes that specifically impose such a duty of
confidentiality, although did find a few court rules that appear to impose this obligation. See e.g. Okla.
Stat. Title 12, Ch. 37, App. A(5)(a)(l) (1993) (code of conduct for mediators establishing that mediator
"shall not reveal, outside the negotiations, information gathered during mediation"). Section 8 of the
UMA makes clear that the UMA does not preempt such rules. Unif. Mediation Act § 8 (2001).
142. In fact, numerous drafts were presented to the mediation community using various approaches to
this issue, and each draft was roundly criticized. See e.g. Draft Unif. Mediation Act. §§ (d) and (e)
(April 1998) <http://www.pn.harvard.edu/guests/uma> (last accessed Mar. 14, 2003); Draft Unif.
Mediation Act. § (e) (Nov. 1998) <http://www.pn.harvard.edu/ guests/uma> (last accessed Mar. 14,
2003); Draft Unif. Mediation Act. § 3 (March 1998) <http://www.pn.harvard.edu/guests/uma> (last
accessed Mar.
14,
2003);
Draft
Unif. Mediation
Act.
§ 3(3) (June
1999)
<http://www.pn.harvard.edu/guests/uma> (last accessed Mar. 14, 2003); Draft Unif. Mediation Act. §
3 (Dec. 1999) (available online at <http: //www.pn.harvard.edu/guests/uma> (last accessed Mar. 14,
2003).
143. The drafters also believed a confidentiality agreement between the parties and even a local rule
would be more likely than a statute to put the parties on notice of the confidentiality requirement.
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sued by a suddenly angered mediation counterpart that they had violated a
statutory duty not to disclose these communications. The drafters felt that
enacting such a duty would create a trap for the unwary, and one with potentially
significant damages, including for emotional distress.
Rather than trying to establish new law on this issue, the Act takes an
approach of restraint. In providing an evidentiary privilege, it establishes
statutory law where statutory law is necessary and uniformity is appropriate and
practicable: the discoverability and admissibility of mediation communications.144
A statute is necessary in this context because parties by private contract cannot
agree to keep evidence from the courts. Uniformity is appropriate because it
promotes certainty about the treatment of mediation communications in the courts
and other formal proceedings, thus allowing the parties to guide their conduct as
appropriate. 145
By contrast, uniformity is not necessary or even appropriate, and much less
practicable, with regard to the disclosure of mediation communications outside of
proceedings. These are the kinds of issues that are traditionally discussed when
confidentiality is discussed during the "contracting" stage of mediation. 146 In
some situations, parties may prefer absolute non-disclosure to any third party; in
other situations, parties may wish to permit, even encourage, disclosures to at least
some other parties to the conflict, family members, business associates, even the
media. 47 These decisions are best left to the good judgment of the parties, to
decide what is appropriate under the unique facts and circumstances of their
disputes, a policy that furthers the Act's fundamental principle of party selfdetermination. Such 1confidentiality
agreements are common in law, and are
48
enforceable in courts.
2. No protectionfor mediator'sobservations and mental impressions
Some concerns were raised during the drafting about the scope of the UMA's
definition of "mediation communication." These concerns appear to have been
driven by the controversial opinion in Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., which
permitted the compulsion of mediator testimony about the mediator's mental
impressions of a party's mental capacity to enter into a mediated settlement
agreement. 49 Some mediators wanted the UMA to take a position that would

144. Unif. Mediation Act, §8 cmt. (b).
145. See Unif. Mediation Act. §8 cmts. (a) and (b).
146. See e.g. Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving
Conflict 200 (2d ed. 1996). Because discussions about the contours of confidentiality are already
standard practice in mediation, it is difficult to respond to Professor Shannon's suggestion that such
discussions will have a chilling effect on mediation because the parties' positions at that point are so
entrenched.
147. For a discussion of media management during public policy mediations, see James E. Kunde,
Dealing with the Press, in Lawrence Susskind et al., The Consensus-Building Handbook: A
Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement 435-463 (Sage Publications, Inc. 1999); see also
Lemoine D. Pierce, Media Access Needs to be Well Managed, 5 Disp. Resol. Mag. 23 (1998).
148. See e.g. Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1977); Stephen A. Hochman, Confidentiality in
Mediation: A Trap for the Unwary, SB41 ALI-ABA 605 (1995); Rogers & McEwen, supra n. 12, at

§§ 9.23, 9.25.
149. 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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effectively codify a reversal of this opinion by specifically including a mediator's
observations and mental impressions within the definition of communication. 50
The drafters declined to take this step because it would have been
fundamentally inconsistent with the rest of the law of privilege, would not have
been justified by any separate policy rationale, and therefore would be unlikely to
be respected by courts. As the comments to this section of the UMA make clear,
the mediation privilege is like other communications privileges in that it covers
5
communications but does not cover conduct that is not intended as an assertion.' '
The reason is that the underlying rationale for privilege is that society is better
served by encouraging this type of communication than by its availability for
introduction into evidence in later proceedings. Therefore, it is the communication
itself that is privileged - the words expressed or conduct that is52intended to have a
communicative effect - not the information behind the words.1
Apart from the physician-patient privilege, which protects information
learned during diagnosis,' 53 no other communications privilege extends beyond
communications to include observations and mental impression, except to the
extent that they are based on privileged communications. The comments,
however, do make clear that mental impressions that are based on mediation
communications would be covered under the UMA. 154 In this regard, mediation
communications are privileged to the same extent as attorney-client
communications - the most sacrosanct protection for communications known to
law - but no farther.
Beyond that, the drafters simply did not believe it
appropriate for a new uniform act to establish a rule of law that would be plainly
inconsistent with other bodies of similar and well-established law. States of
course
55
are free to fashion such rules if they so desire, as Texas most notably has.
3. No notice requirementwhen invoking the privilege
Some have expressed occasional concern that the UMA does not require
someone who seeks to introduce mediation communications to notify other
possible holders of the privilege of that intent. The thrust of the argument here is
that without such notice the non-testifying holders would never know of the need
to assert the privilege, thereby making the privilege effectively worthless.
This is not a trivial concern. However, the fact of the matter is that notice
requirements vary widely by jurisdiction, and even then are commonly
promulgated and implemented by courts rather than legislatures to take into
account other local court rules, practices, and standards. For this reason,
presumably, none of the states that have used the privilege structure for protecting
the confidentiality of mediation communications have adopted notice provisions,
150. See Resolution of the International Academy of Mediators Opposing Adoption of the Uniform
Mediation Act (Oct. 31, 2001) (copy on file with author).
151. See Unif. Mediation Act §2(2) (2001) (citing nineteen statutes).
152. See Jeffrey M. Senger, Federal Dispute Resolution: Using ADR in United States Government
Cases 270 (forthcoming 2003) (copy on file with author).
153. Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence §§ 98-105 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed., West
1999).
154. See Unif. Mediation Act §2(2) (2001) (citing nineteen statutes).
155. Texas Civ. Prac. & Remedies § 154.073 (2003). To the extent states do enact such provisions,
consensus may emerge, perhaps so sufficient as to justify amending the UMA.
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and the drafters were unaware of any reports that the lack of a notice requirement
has been problematic. Similarly, the drafters were unaware of any reason to
believe notice requirements need to be uniform. To the contrary, they were
concerned about the capacity of a uniform notice requirement to be disruptive of
local court rules, customs, and practices, and to unnecessarily constrain local
discretion to adapt notice requirements to local needs and circumstances that are
sometimes changing. Finally, drafters were concerned that a notice provision
would have violated NCCUSL's standard prohibitions against drafting regulatory
legislation.' 6 Again, however, states and local court rules are free to legislate in
this area if they deem it wise and appropriate.
IV. MOVING FORWARD ON THE UMA
NCCUSL's history of general success would suggest that state legislatures
would consider giving
some deference to the national four-year drafting process
that led to the UMA. 157 However, the drafters did leave some specific choices to
states to resolve according to their own policies, practices, and traditions. I have
already discussed a few of them, most notably whether to place an affirmative
duty of confidentiality on non-proceeding disclosures, t 58 and whether to expand
the definition of mediation communications to include a mediation participant's
observations and mental impressions.159 In this last section, I want to focus on
three other specific and significant choices that the UMA leaves to the states:
which current statutory provisions to repeal or retain (Section 15), whether to
require mediator impartiality (Section 9(g)), and the scope of the section of the
privilege exception for mediation communications evidencing abuse of vulnerable
parties (Section 6(a)(7)).
A. Section 15: Repeals
For some states, Section 15 may be one of the most important in the UMA
because it most directly addresses how the UMA will fit into the state's own law.
For most states, this should be relatively painless because the UMA employs the
same approach to mediation communications that is used in most states (both
general and subject specific states), because the exceptions are substantially
similar to the law of most states, and because the Act's other substantive
provisions generally track most state laws.'6
Still, this is an issue upon which state legislators and their mediation
communities should approach with care because there may be elements of the
state's mediation law that are desireable, which may be perfectly consistent with

156. See supra n. 27.
157. See Brudney, supra n. 20, at 809-13; Schwartz & Scott, supra n. 30, at 610-16.
158. Unif. Mediation Act § 8 (2001). See supra nn. 142-48 and accompanying text.

159. Unif. Mediation Act § 2(2) (2001). See supra nf. 149-55 and accompanying text.
160. One exception is the rule permitting parties the accompaniment of support persons, which is
inconsistent with the law in a relatively small handful of states that expressly prohibits counsel from
attending mediations. See Unif. Mediation Act § 10, Comments (2001). A second exception is § 7's
prohibition on mediator reports to judges who may make rulings on the dispute, which may run afoul
of some formal and informal mediator reporting practices. See Unif. Mediation Act § 7 (2001).
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the UMA, and which therefore need not be repealed in order to make room for the
UMA. The UMA is drafted as a floor, rather than a ceiling, providing what the
drafters hope will be the minimum level of protection for the mediation process
and its participants in states that enact the UMA. States are of course free to
provide for other regulations, and may for example want to be sure to keep in
place a rule of statutory law, a court rule, or a judicial doctrine that is particularly
meaningful to that jurisdiction. Common examples include authorization of
mandatory mediation, standards for mediators, and funding for mediation
programs. 16 In such situations, an abundance of caution may counsel in favor of
noting specifically in Section 15 which provisions of current state laws are not
being repealed, as well as which ones are being repealed. By the same token,
states specifically wishing to repeal a statute, court rule, or court decision, should
specify those laws in this section with particularity as well.
Minnesota provides a good example. Depending upon how you count them,
Minnesota has about twenty-five different statutes, court rules, and rules of
evidence affecting mediation confidentiality, 162 as well as significant Supreme
Court authority. 163 Because of the resulting confusion over the state of the law, it
would make sense for Minnesota to give the Uniform Mediation Act serious
consideration, and it in fact has been doing so for some time. 64 The UMA's
privilege should comfortably replace the Minnesota privilege for parties and for
what the UMA refers to as "non-party participants.'
However, Minnesota law
most clearly protects against potential mediator disclosure of mediation
communications in proceedings by making the mediator incompetent to testify in
such proceedings.166 This is a relatively uncommon approach in state
legislation,167 and after giving it due consideration, the UMA drafters decided to
use a single form of protection - privilege - for all participants in mediation to
avoid the potential for confusion.
Still, the Minnesota mediation and legal communities may really like the
testamentary incapacity approach and if so, should take care to note in Section 16
that the mediator incapacity provision is not preempted by the Minnesota UMA.
However, such a decision raises other drafting complications - such as, in this
context, what to do with the UMA privilege for mediators.
One option would be to keep the testimonial incapacity provision in place,
and delete the mediator privilege. This would also require Minnesota to take a
hard look at Section 6(a)(5), which permits mediators to testify in their selfdefense when sued by a party for malpractice, or brought into some kind of
161. Unif. Mediation Act § 15, Comments (2001)
162. See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Analysis of Uniform Mediation Act (2001) (copy on
file with author); Peter N. Thompson, Confidentiality, Competency and Confusion: The Uncertain
Promise of the Mediation Privilegein Minnesota, 18 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Policy 329 (1997).
163. See Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co., 577 N.W.2d 927 (Minn. 1998)
(handwritten document prepared by the parties' attorneys at the conclusion of mediation session was
unenforceable as a mediated settlement agreement under the Minnesota Civil Mediation Act because it
failed to use certain language to denote the applicability of the Act).
164. See Letter from Jennelle Soderquist, CMDR Section Chair, and Rebecca M. Picard, CMDR
Ethics Committee Chair, to the Hon. Michael B. Getty, Chair, NCCUSL UMA Drafting Committee,
Uniform MediationAct (Oct. 7 1999) (copy on file with Author).
165. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02, subd. (la) (1996).
166. Id.
167. But see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48.109(3) (1997); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23A-9 (2003).
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misconduct proceeding. 68 Unless Minnesota anticipates a regime of immunity
and non-discipline for mediators - that is, no formal accountability at all - a
responsive exception to testimonial incapacity seems only fair to the accused
mediator. Minnesota would also have to consider deleting Section 6(c), which
bars mediator testimony in disputes over the validity of a mediated settlement
agreement and in professional malpractice or misconduct proceedings in which
the mediator is not named or charged (such as in a client's malpractice or
misconduct complaint against his or her lawyer).169 The drafters felt it was
inappropriate for mediators to be used as tie-breakers in these situations, but
Minnesota may have a different view based on its experience with the general
mediator incompetency provision, just as it may have with respect to
70 the other
listed exceptions that would otherwise apply to the mediator privilege.
While such an approach would have the advantage of preserving existing
Minnesota law, it would provide the mediator with a lesser degree of protection
than the UMA provides in at least two respects that Minnesota may want to
consider. First, already discussed, is the capacity of the mediator to defend himself
or herself against malpractice or misconduct situations. Second, the testimonial
incapacity approach does not permit mediators to block testimony other than their
own. The legal authority of a mediator to block parties and non-party participants
from testifying about statements made by the mediator in a mediation seemed to
be important to mediator representatives at the UMA drafting session, but
Minnesota again may have a different view based on its experience with its
current legal regime.
A second option would be to leave both the mediator privilege and the
mediator testimonial incapacity in place as is. This would undermine the goal of
simplification, because the two provisions overlap substantially, although not
exclusively. In particular, courts would likely have to resolve the question of
whether the mediator testimonial exceptions to the UMA privilege provided in
Sections 6(a)(5), 6(a)(6), and 6(c) are also exceptions to the pre-existing rule of
mediator testimonial incapacity. That is certainly a possible outcome considering
the interpretive canon that a legislature's most recent pronouncement on an issue
prevails over an older pronouncement, to the extent they are inconsistent.' 71 If
this is deemed an undesirable result, Minnesota may wish to provide courts with

168. To date, mediator discipline is generally not regulated by states. One notable exception is
Florida, which has a sophisticated system of court-ordered education, training, ethical requirements,
and mediator discipline procedures in its Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators.
See Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 44.106 (1999) (authorizing the rules); Fla. R. Med. 10.100 et seq. (Florida Rules
for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators). Still, an attorney-mediator may be brought before a
lawyer disciplinary body for misconduct arising from his or her service as a mediator.
169. Unif. Mediation Act § 6(a)(6) (2001).
170. While the question is uncommon, given judicial pressures favoring the receipt of relevant
evidence, one might reasonably question whether a court that determines it needs mediator testimony as in Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (mediator testimony necessary for court to decide whether a party
had capacity to enter into mediated settlement agreement) - might be tempted to find Minnesota's
mediator testimonial incapacity provision to have the effect of making the mediator "unavailable" for
purposes of relevant exceptions to the hearsay rule. See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatric,
Evidence 898-951 (3d ed. 2003).
171. See William N. Eskridge Jr, Philip B. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory
Interpretation273-74 (Found. Press 2000).
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black letter guidance with appropriate cross-referencing language in one or both
of the provisions in Section 15.
A third option would be to keep the mediator privilege in place, and to
consider exceptions to the mediator testimonial incapacity provisions that would
at least include those exceptions covered by Section 6 of the UMA, perhaps
among others. This approach would have the benefits of retaining the current rule
of testimonial incapacity, providing the mediator with the ability to block, and
eliminating the conflict between the statutes. However, it also carries the capacity
to generate more confusion, and with questionable gain over the current UMA
given that the new list of exceptions may ultimately be quite similar in the end to
what the UMA already provides.
A fourth option is, of course, to leave the UMA mediator privilege intact,
delete the mediator incapacity provision, and incorporate the body of law and
community norms into the state's own legislative history of Section 6(c). This
would have the benefit of clarity and the literal retention of current legal and
normative regimes, but might leave disquieted those who are comfortable with,
and comforted by, the current rule of testimonial incapacity.
While the foregoing discussion focuses on Minnesota, it is offered only as an
example of how other states may want to take a hard look at what their current law
provides, so that informed legislative choices can be made as the UMA is used to
modernize and clean up their mediation legal regimes.
B. Section 9(g): The optional requirementof mediatorimpartiality
The UMA's disclosure section includes a requirement of mediator
impartiality that is offered to states as a bracketed, or optional, provision, Section
9(g).
The neutrality of the mediator is an important value in mediation, a point
made consistently throughout the drafting process by the Association for Conflict
Resolution ("ACR"), a mediator professional organization. 72 The drafting
committees did not disagree with this principle as a matter of practice, but
received comments from other mediators, judges, provider organizations, program
directors, and other UMA constituencies who were deeply concerned about
enshrining this value in a black letter law. Several sources of potential mischief
surfaced during the drafters' consideration of this issue.
The most common concern was that such a requirement could easily be
abused by disgruntled parties - ones who on reflection did not like the deal they
had struck in mediation, and who might use a challenge to the "impartiality" of
the mediator as a basis for vacating the mediated settlement agreement. This
concern was particularly salient to mediators with a more evaluative style, who
feared their common practice of so-called "reality checking" would be used as a
basis for such actions against them as mediators. Moreover, scholarly research in
cognitive psychology has confirmed many hidden but common biases that affect
judgment, such as attributional distortions of judgment and inclinations that are

172. See Gregory Firestone, Ph.D., An Analysis of Principled Advocacy in the Development of the

Uniform Mediation Act, 22 N. Ill.
U. L. Rev. 265, 280-82 (2002).
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the product of social learning and professional culturation.173 Taken out of
context, these too could be argued as a basis for a finding of bias.
A related concern was over the workability of a statutory impartiality
requirement across mediation contexts. In some contexts, mediators sometimes
have an ethical or felt duty to advocate on behalf of a party, such as long-term
care ombuds in the health care context.' 74 Sometimes, too, parties seek to use a
mediator who has a duty to be partial in some respects - such as a domestic1 75
relations mediator who is charged by law to protect the interests of the children.
Such obligations seemed inconsistent with the notion of a statutory requirement of
impartiality. Finally, there were autonomy concerns, as the drafters recognized
that there are times when the best mediator for a dispute may be one whose
personal qualities or gravitas commands similar respect from parties, even though
that mediator may have a prior, ongoing, or future relationship with one or more
of the parties.
A compromise between the drafters and ACR sent the UMA to its final vote
before NCCUSL with the concept of impartiality addressed as an interpretive
principle in a section entitled "Application and Interpretation."'' 76 However, after
much debate on the floor, the NCCUSL Conference of the Whole deleted that
Section as a violation of NCCUSL's general rule against so-called "purpose"
clauses. 177
Back at the drawing board, the drafters concluded that as a matter of law - as
distinguished from a matter of mediation practice - the concept of impartiality
created the least potential for mischief when implemented through a requirement
that compelled arbitrators to disclose reasonably known conflicts of interest.
After the deletion of Section 2 at the final reading, the Drafters added a model
provision on impartiality for states that may wish to assume the aforementioned
risks and capture this mediation value with specificity as part of the general
disclosure obligations of Section 9.
C. The "exception to the exception" for mediation communications
evidencing abuse of vulnerable parties
A third significant choice that the UMA leaves to the states is the scope of the
exception to the general rule of mediation confidentiality for statements that
evidence the abuse of a vulnerable party.
173. Supran. 110.
174. See Jeffrey S. Kahana, Reevaluating the Nursing Home Ombudsman's Role with a View Toward
Expandingthe Concept of Dispute Resolution, 1994 J. of Dis. Res. 217, 232.
175. See e.g. Kenneth S. Gallant, Promoting the Best Interests of Children Whose Parents Are
Divorcing: The Next Steps for Arkansas 607 (discussing, inter alia, Arkansas legislation allowing
court-ordered mediation).
176. See Interim Draft Unif. Mediation Act § 2 (Aug. 13, 2001). To the surprise of the UMA Drafting
Committee, however, ACR continued to lobby the full Conference for a separate provision on mediator
impartiality. See Letter from Arnold T. Schienvold, president, Association for Conflict Resolution, to
the Hon. Michael B. Getty, Chair, NCCUSL UMA Drafting Committee (Aug, 13, 2001) (copy on file
with author) (endorsing UMA, but offering "proposed modification (on mediator impartiality) to the
Uniform Mediation Act").
177. NCCUSL, Proceduraland Drafting Manual Rule 22 (1997). That section is now included in the
Comments as recommended language for states that permit purpose clauses. Unif. Mediation Act,
Prefatory Note (2001).
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A little background helps to set the stage. Because the UMA does not limit
disclosures outside of proceedings, mediators with ethical or felt obligations to
report abuse may meet these duties without any interference by the UMA. Since
the UMA does generally bar admission of mediation communications evidence in
subsequent proceedings, however, the question becomes whether mediators or
parties may provide testimony in such proceedings - which may well be a
proceeding at least in part intended to terminate the abusive relationship. Many
mediators wanted the capacity to participate in these kinds of proceedings if their
testimony would help bring an end to the abuse, and thus favored an exception to
the general rule of confidentiality, as is common in many states. 7 '
However, the Association of Conflict Resolution raised concerns about the
implications of such an exception on the family mediation programs found in
many courts - concerns, it should be noted, not shared by the Association of
Family and Conciliation Courts1 79 or a task force of the ABA Commission on
Mental and Physical Disability. 180 In particular, ACR's position was that many
family mediations included claims of domestic violence, child abuse, or similar
claims, and that parties simply would not participate in such mediations in a
meaningful way if they knew that statements related to the abuse would be
admissible in a subsequent proceeding. 8' The problem thus pit two important
values against each other: physical safety versus process integrity.
The drafters came down on the side of physical safety, granting an exception
for the abuse of vulnerable parties in Section 6(a)(7). However, ACR continued
to lobby hard on this issue after that fundamental decision was made, responding
to safety concerns by stressing the capacity of skillful mediators to be able to
identify and manage situations involving abuse or violence. Others opposing the
ACR initiative responded with their own concerns about the levels of skill and
commitment of mediators in these programs to deal with these problems in fact concerns expressed both within and beyond those sectors of the community that
work with vulnerable party mediations. The drafters ultimately agreed to let the
states decide for themselves the scope of the "exception to the exception,"
depending upon the comfort level that state legislators have with the training,
practices, and procedures of their court-related programs with respect to domestic
violence and other issues relating to the abuse of vulnerable parties.
Two alternative "exceptions to the exception" are explicitly offered.
Alternative A is the more limited of the two, and would create an "exception to
178. See Unif. Mediation Act § 6(a)(7), Comment (2001).
179. AFCC is the largest professional organization serving this population, and endorsed the UMA
despite heavy lobbying by ACR. See supra nn. 2-5.
180. See Letter from James Carr, chair, American Bar Association Commission on Mental and
Physical Disability Law, to the Hon. Michael B. Getty, chair, NCCUSL UMA Drafting Committee,
Uniform MediationAct (Nov. 15, 2000) (on file with author).
181. There exists a significant question in the mediation community over whether such cases should
be mediated at all. See Unif. Mediation Act § 6(a)(7), Comments (2001). Many states prohibit
mediation of cases in which domestic violence has occurred. See e.g. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-311(1)
(2001); Minn Stat. Ann. § 518.619 subd. 2 (West Supp. 1999); Va. Code Ann. 20-124.4 (Michie
1995). Many court programs specifically screen out of mandatory mediation requirements those cases
in which there is the potential for violence or abuse. See generally Jessica Pearson, Mediating When
Domestic Violence Is a Factor: Policies and Practices in Court-BasedDivorce Mediation Programs,
14 Mediation Q. 319, 325-26 (1997) (describing practices for screening cases for exclusion from
mediation due to domestic violence).
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the exception" that would preclude the introduction of mediation communications
that evidence abuse of vulnerable parties in subsequent proceedings under two
conditions: the parties are routed to the mediation pursuant to some court-related
mediation program, and that one of the state's own agencies (such as a
Department of Children's Services) is a party to the conflict. In those situations presumably a large class of cases - the main exception for vulnerable party abuse
simply would not apply at all and mediation communications evidencing such
abuse would not be admissible into evidence in a hearing in which that abuse was
relevant under any circumstance. Alternative B, on the other hand, is a broader
exception to the exception, and would apply if a state agency was involved in the
mediation, regardless of whether the mediation was ordered or offered through a
court-connected program. States would choose Alternative B primarily if they do
not have court-related programs, and want to provide an "exception to the
exception" for the reasons heretofore stated.
The official Comments direct states to choose one of those two options.,82
However, the closeness of the votes of the Drafting Committees suggests states in
fact may take at least two other options. One is to simply delete the Section
6(a)(7) exception entirely, rather than having a confusing legal regime that
included an exception, and then an exception to the exception that substantially
eviscerates the exception. This would reflect a policy choice favoring the
mediation process value over the physical safety value, an uncompromised
endorsement of ACR's position at the UMA drafting. On the other hand, it is also
plausible to imagine a state preferring to go in the other direction, rejecting both
alternatives and simply having no exception to the exception at all. 183 This would
reflect a policy decision favoring the safety value over the process value.
V. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Mediation Act presents a unique opportunity for states to
modernize their mediation laws, and to bring them into alignment with the
expectations of participants in mediation, as well as the public's expectation with
regard to the integrity of the mediation process.
It was
It was the product of an unprecedented drafting process.
unprecedented in terms of the alliance between NCCUSL and the ABA,
unprecedented in terms of the breadth and depth of the discussions regarding
mediation during the drafting of the UMA, and unprecedented as finally drafted in
terms of the breadth of its support across constituencies potentially affected by
mediation. As Dean James Alfini and David Hoffman have suggested, the
promulgation of the UMA represents "the coming of (legal age)" of the mediation
process.184
As Professor Harter has also suggested, the UMA also stands as a monument
to the best the field has to offer in terms of process - an example of the field
182. Unif. Mediation Act § 6(a)(7) (2001).
183. One would expect that states preferring this approach would simply put a period after the word
"party" at the end of § 6(a)(7), and delete the "unless the" language and both of the two alternatives
following thereafter.
184. See David A. Hoffman, Introduction (in this volume); James J. Alfini, Mediation's Coming of
(Legal) Age, 22 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 153, 154 (2002).
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"walking the talk."1 8 5 Issues were engaged forcefully, and the Act and supporting
comments are much stronger because of the drafters' insistence upon seeking out,
listening to, understanding, and when possible, accommodating the many
competing views at the table. The end product is a result that none can personally
claim, but all can support as a significant improvement for the law of mediation.
Truly collaborative rulemaking can hope for little more.
This fact was appreciated by the many active participants in the UMA
drafting process - drafters, reporters, observers, unofficial commenters, academic
advisors, etc. It is only natural that newcomers to the Act as it goes to the states
will raise questions with regard to the many difficult and important issues that
were discussed at length during the five-year research and drafting effort. The
strength of the UMA as a consensual drafting process is its capacity to provide
thoughtful answers to those perfectly understandable questions. Apart from the
nuances posed by particular state consideration of the UMA, the relatively few
concerns sounded today as the UMA goes to the states are not new. Rather, to the
extent that the UMA kicked up a storm during the drafting, they are the sounds of
the dust settling on a successful collaborative effort.

185. Philip J. Haiter, The Uniform Mediation Act: An Essential Framework for Self-Determination,
22 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 251, 252-53 (2002).
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